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It is as undeniable as it is unhelpful to say that for Locke personal identity
consists in the identity of consciousness. It is undeniable because he just
comes out and says as much in passages like the following: “[T]he same con-
sciousness being preserv’d. . .the personal Identity is preserv’d.” (II.xxvii.13)1
It is unhelpful, however, for two reasons: First, it is unclear what conscious-
ness is; what portion of a mind’s mental activity at a time is its “conscious-
ness”? Second, even if we knew what, of all the myriad things going on in
my mind now is my “consciousness” and we knew what, of all the myriad
things that went on in the mind of a child who, in 1976 was forced to wear
an embarrassing sailor suit, is his “consciousness”, it would still be unclear
what conditions must be satisfied for the two “consciousnesses” to be the
same. The simple memory theory of personal identity—the theory according
to which later and earlier person-stages are stages of the same person just
in case the later can remember the experience of the earlier—tries to solve
both problems at once. The theory equates consciousness with any conscious
act of awareness and then insists that two acts of awareness are the same in
the relevant sense if they have the same content, if they are awarenesses of
the very same thing. What makes my “consciousness” and the sailor-suit-
wearing boy’s the same, on this view, is that we are both aware of the same
event, and in the same way.
The simple memory theory has the great virtue of intelligibility, but
it has many familiar problems, and there are familiar problems with at-
tributing it to Locke. I won’t rehearse either here. My aim, instead, is to
make some progress in determining what Locke actually understands “con-
sciousness” to be and to use what I learn to shed some light on his the-
ory of personal identity. Consciousness is, obviously, a form of awareness;
this it has in common with sensation, which is also, for Locke, a form of
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awareness. And consciousness is, obviously, directed inward. As Locke puts
it, “[c]onsciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind.”
(II.i.19). In this way it differs from sensory perception, which is awareness
not of what goes on in the mind, but of what goes on outside it. But can
more be said? Are there further, and more important, differences between
sensation and consciousness? They differ in their objects, but do they differ
in other important ways as well? To answer this question, I will be looking
in what might seem, at first, a peculiar place; I will be looking at Locke’s
discussion of the idea of duration in II.xiv. My claim is that the argument
of that chapter sheds significant light on Locke’s notion of consciousness
and what makes it different from sensory perception. Most of this paper will
be spent drawing from Locke’s discussion of duration a difference between
consciousness and sensory perception. However, at the end, I’ll return to the
“same consciousness” theory of personal identity and say a word about how
that theory might be understood in light of what we will have learned about
the nature of consciousness, as Locke understands it.
The notion of duration that Locke has in mind when, in II.xiv, he un-
dertakes to explain how we acquire the idea, is inherited from Descartes.2
Descartes was concerned with the question of whether duration was some-
thing over and above the things that possessed duration or whether it was,
instead, a quality that emerged from the existence of a thing. He sides with
the latter view, making the following remark about duration:
[W]e should regard the duration of a thing simply as a mode under which we
conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist.3
So, for Descartes a thing has the quality of duration just in case it has the
general property of continuous existence. We might think of the property this
way: if an object’s path through time is continuous, then it has the property of
duration. On the view of duration that Descartes offers it seems that particu-
lar amounts of duration are to duration as figures are to extension; both are
particular ways in which something continuous (extension in time, extension
in space) can be terminated. Locke endorses this conception, writing that
“we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of our selves,
or anything else. . .the Duration of our selves, or any such other thing. . .”
(II.xiv.3).4
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider a bit further how Locke
must be thinking of continuity of existence, of duration, given the way he
construes a number of closely-related concepts. Consider, for instance, his
infamous gloss on the “principium individuationis”:
[T]he principium Individuationis. . .is Existence it self, which determines a Being
of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the
same kind. . .Let us suppose an Atom. . .existing in a determined time and place:
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‘tis evident, that, considered in any instant of its Existence, it is, in that instant,
the same with it self. For being, at that instant, what it is, and nothing else, it
is the same, and so must continue, as long as its Existence is continued: for so
long it will be the same, and no other. (II.xxvii.3)
Here Locke uses the notion of continuity of existence to explain—or, ar-
guably, to debunk—the idea of that which distinguishes each thing from
others, which gives a things its identity. At a time, a thing is identical to all
and only those things of the same kind that occupy the same place as it; over
time a thing is identical to all and only those things in which its existence is
continued. Thus, for Locke the notion of existence is interdefinable with the
notion of occupying a place. Locke takes it to be axiomatic that two things
of the same kind cannot occupy the same place at the same time. But, more
importantly, Locke uses that axiom to say what it is to exist at a time: it
is to occupy a place that others of the same kind cannot occupy. To exist
continuously, then, is to continuously occupy places that distinct others of
one’s kind cannot occupy.
To understand what, exactly, this means consider Locke’s example of an
atom and make two simplifying assumptions: assume that the atom occupies
exactly one point at any one time, and imagine that the atom’s universe is
one dimensional; it consists of nothing but a number line. Consider the set of
places occupied at some time or another by the atom. Call that set P. If the
atom exists continuously, P must be what I will call “densely packed”: for any
two members of P—two places occupied by the object—there is a member of
P that lies between them; that is, there is a member of P that is closer to each
of the two members than they are to each other. Thus, for a set of places to
be densely packed, there must be some measure of distance between places.
However, to be densely packed is not enough for continuous existence, for
the atom might leap, say, from 0 to 1 and then return to cover the points
in between 0 and 1. In such a case, the atom’s occupation of place would
not be continuous, but would involve a leap. To prevent this possibility we
must imagine that P is also what I will call “densely ordered”: the path that
the thing travels through the members of P over time must be continuous
in the mathematical sense. That is, if the atom continuously exists and if at
some time in its lifetime the atom occupies point 0 and at another later time
occupies point 1, then it must move through all of the points between 0 and
1 and must do so continuously. If the set of places occupied by a thing is
densely ordered, it is also densely packed (although, for reasons that I hope
become clear, it is nonetheless helpful to have the notion of a densely packed
set of places). So, we can say that a thing enjoys continuity of existence only
if the set of places that it occupies during its lifetime is densely ordered.
This is a necessary condition on continuity of existence; as we will see in a
moment, it is not sufficient.
But first, consider the notion of “place”. Place turns out to be an ex-
traordinarily elusive notion for Locke—more elusive than the example of an
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atom captures. What kind of property a thing’s place is depends on what
kind of thing it is and on our purposes in designating it. The place of an
atom, an extended object, is physical position or position in space. The place
of a chess piece, however, is, for many purposes, determined by the square it
occupies on the board; the king may be said to be occupying the same place
as before even though it has been moved within the square that it occupied,
and even though the board has been moved across the room (II.xiii.7–8). As
Locke says,
[T]his Modification of Distance, we call Place, being made by Men, for their
common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular Position
of Things, where they had occasion for such Designation, Men consider and
determine of this Place, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served
to their present Purpose, without considering other things, which to another
Purpose would better determine the Place of the same thing. (II.xiii.9)
The relativity of a thing’s place to our purposes in identifying its place is
surely related, for Locke, to the relativity of a thing’s kind to our purposes
in identifying the thing’s kind, a well-known, and well-explored, feature of
Locke’s account of kind membership.5 Locke also suggests, however, that
a thing’s place need not even be a physical location, not even a relative
physical location, for there are notions of distance that are non-physical
and with them come corresponding notions of adjacency and of place. For
instance, he offers the following example:
[I]f any one should ask, in what Place are the Verses, which report the Story
of Nisus and Eurialus, ‘twould be very improper to determine this Place, by
saying, they were in such a part of the Earth, or in Bodley’s Library: But the
right Designation of the place, would be by the parts of Virgil’s Works; and the
proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the middle of the Ninth
Book of his AEneids; And that they have been always constantly in the same
Place ever since Virgil was printed. (II.xiii.9)
It seems to me virtually impossible to give good sense to Locke’s idea here
without considering the place of the story as something distinct from position
in space in the ordinary sense. It seems, rather, that with the identification
of the relevant kind of thing comes a corresponding notion of distance and
a corresponding notion of place which is such that two things of the same
identified kind cannot at the same time occupy the same place, in that sense
of place.
In short, then, for a thing to enjoy the property of duration, or continuous
existence, is, at least in part, for the set of places that it occupies to be densely
ordered, with the understanding that the notion of place itself, and the notion
of distance between places that that concept requires, are determined by the
kind to which the thing belongs. To have the idea of a thing’s duration, then,
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is to represent the set of places that thing occupies to be densely ordered;
such a conception, then, involves, in the background, a conception of the
kind to which the thing belongs, a kind that brings with it conceptions of
place and of distance among places.
However, there’s more to the notion of continuous existence, even, than
this. To see this, it helps to consider what Locke contrasts continuous exis-
tence with, namely successive existence. He writes,
Only as to things whose Existence is in succession, such as are the Actions of
finite Beings, v.g. Motion and Thought, both which consist in a continued train
of Succession, concerning their Diversity there can be no question: Because
each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or
in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant
places. (II.xxvii.2)
The idea here is something like this: when I move my finger from, say, point
0 to point 1 on a number line, the tip of my finger successively occupies each
of the points on the interval; but would it be right to say that the movement
of my finger—that is, the action—successively occupied those points? No, for
the movement is not at point 0 and later at point 1/2 and yet later at point 1,
as the tip of my finger is. The part of the movement that is going on when
my finger is at point 1/2 is gone as soon as my finger is no longer at that
point; it doesn’t exist again later at point 3/4 and yet again at point 1; rather
new movement parts exist at those points. Notice, however, that there is no
meaningful sense in which the set of places occupied by the tip of my finger
is distinct from the set of places occupied by the movement of my finger.
If the movement takes place anywhere, it takes place on the points from 0
to 1. But if the sets of places occupied by the two things is the same, then
it’s not possible for one and not the other to be densely ordered; whatever
features the one set has the other has as well. However, the tip of the finger
exists continuously while the movement of the finger exists successively. What
follows is that there must be more to continuous existence than is captured
by appeal to sets of places that are densely ordered.
What more is there? The answer is contained, it seems to me, in the
passage just quoted. What Locke is noticing is that time of existence is an
essential property of the parts of successively existing things, and it is these
parts that can be said to occupy certain locations; not so in continuously
existing things. It is also parts of continuously existing things that occupy
locations—it is the tip of the finger, not the whole finger, that occupies, at a
certain time, point 0 on the number line. But it is not an essential property of
that part that it exist at any particular time. It does not “perish the moment
it begins”.
To summarize, for Locke continuous existence can be defined like so:
A thing exists continuously if and only if (1) The set of places it occupies is
densely ordered, and (2) The parts of the thing that occupy particular places
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are capable of existing at different times; they are not excluded from doing so
by their essential properties.
Notice that, and this will be of some importance later, if you were to recognize
that a thing that exists at a particular time is exactly the same thing as
something existing at another time, that would be enough to recognize that
what you are encountering is not something that “perpetually perishes”; if
the same thing exists at different times, then time of existence can’t be among
its essential properties.
Return, now, to Locke’s discussion of duration in II.xiv. Given the contrast
between continuous and successive existence, the remark with which Locke
opens that chapter is extraordinarily provocative. He writes,
THERE is another sort of Distance, or Length, the Idea whereof we get. . .from
the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we call Duration.
(II.xiv.1)
The reason this remark is provocative is that Locke is telling us that we
get the idea of a continuous, uninterrupted existence from the perception of
something that does not possess that property; we get it from a succession
that has “perpetually perishing parts” and therefore fails the second condi-
tion above for continuous existence. Thus, Locke is claiming that our minds
pull a rabbit from a hat: it is from something that lacks duration that we
derive our idea of it. How does this come to pass?
In answering this question, Locke makes two claims, one positive and
one negative. The positive claim is that we derive the idea of duration from
reflection on the succession of our ideas. The negative claim is that we cannot
derive the idea from the sensation of motion, the sensation, that is, of the
succession of places occupied by an object. So, the rabbit cannot be pulled
from just any hat; not any old perceived succession is useful for acquiring
the idea of duration; only a succession of one’s own ideas will do. Thus,
Locke must explain how we get the idea of duration from reflection on the
succession of our ideas, and the explanation must not promiscuously allow
for the acquisition of the idea from the perception of other successions, such
as the succession of places occupied by a thing in motion. Conversely, the
explanation for why we cannot get the idea of duration from the sensation
of motion must not rule out the possibility that we are able to acquire the
idea from reflection on the succession of our ideas.
Let’s look first at what Locke has to say in support of the negative claim,
the claim that we cannot derive the idea of duration from the perception
of motion. What he has to say on this score is easily misunderstood. It is
clear that he is attacking our capacity to get the idea of succession from the
sensory perception of motion. Given what the idea of duration is, this is a
reasonable strategy. After all, you can’t have the idea of duration without
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having an idea that represents the places a thing occupies as densely ordered;
but such an idea must, then, represent those places as ordered—that is, as in
succession. Thus, if you can’t have the idea of succession from the perception
of motion, we can be certain that you can’t have the idea of duration from
that perception. But, still, it is far from clear why he thinks we lack the
capacity to acquire the idea of succession from the perception of motion. In
support of this claim, he writes,
[B]y reflecting on the appearing of various Ideas, one after another in our Un-
derstandings, we get the Notion of Succession; which if any one should think, we
did rather get from our Observation of Motion by our Senses, he will, perhaps,
be of my Mind, when he considers, that even Motion produces in his Mind an
Idea of Succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of
distinguishable Ideas. For a Man looking upon a Body really moving, perceives
yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces a constant train of successive
Ideas. v.g. a Man becalmed at Sea, out of sight of Land, in a fair Day, may look
on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no Motion at
all in either; though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have moved,
during that time, a great way: But as soon as he perceives either of them to have
changed distance with some other Body, as soon as this Motion produces any
new Idea in him, then he perceives, that there has been Motion. (II.xiv.6)
What reason does Locke give in this passage for thinking that we can’t get
the idea of succession from the perception of motion? There is a way of
reading what he says in support of that claim that involves attributing to
him a really silly argument, and much in the passage just quoted encourages
the attribution. The silly argument runs like this: “Sometimes a thing is
moving, but an observer can’t tell. Such an observer doesn’t have the idea of
succession from the perception of the thing even though the thing is, in fact,
occupying a succession of distinct places. Therefore, the idea of succession is
not derived from the perception of motion.” The problem, of course, is that
if the observer can’t tell that the thing is in motion, then he isn’t actually
sensing motion. If a hypothetical observer who doesn’t sense motion still had
a certain concept, then that would be evidence that that concept is not derived
from the sensation of motion. But the fact that a hypothetical observer who
doesn’t sense motion, lacks the idea of succession leaves the sensation of
motion as one of the candidate ways in which the concept is acquired; if he’d
only noticed that the thing he saw was in motion, we might say, then he would
have had the idea of succession. That, however, is the opposite conclusion
from the one Locke intends to draw. Now, in the passage just quoted, Locke
does add that someone who does sense motion has a succession of ideas.
But that point doesn’t help, since, for such a person, there are two things in
succession and the observer is aware of both: he is aware through sensation
of the successive places occupied by the object, and he is aware through
reflection of the successive states of his mind. Who’s to say that he doesn’t
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derive his idea of succession from the former of these two successions, the
successive places occupied by the object?
But if Locke isn’t offering this silly argument in support of the negative
claim, what is he saying? To understand the point that he’s after, it helps to
consider a gruesome example that he offers a few paragraphs later:
Let a Cannon-Bullet pass through a Room, and in its way take with it any
Limb, or fleshy Parts of a Man; ‘tis as clear as any Demonstration can be, that
it must strike successively the two sides of the Room: ‘Tis also evident, that it
must touch one part of the Flesh first, and another after; and so in Succession:
And yet I believe, no Body, who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the
blow against the two distant Walls, could perceive any Succession, either in the
pain, or sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein
we perceive no Succession, is that which we may call an Instant; and is that
which takes up the time of only one Idea in our Minds, without the Succession
of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession at all. (II.xiv.10)
Had Locke had access to cameras, he might have made this point by analogy
to them. His claim is that the senses have the equivalent of a shutter speed,
and just as the film represents all that happens while the shutter is open as
simultaneous, and not in succession, so the mind registers all that happens in
succession within a certain interval of time as simultaneous. All that happens
from the moment the cannonball enters the room to the moment it exits is
represented by one static idea, and so is represented not as successive, but
as taking place at once. Just as a photograph of the event would show a
cannonball streak stretching from one side of the room to the other—thus
representing the cannonball in many places at once—so does the idea of the
observer. And, in fact—and here’s where the analogy with the camera breaks
down—the mind does this across the various modes of sensation, across,
for instance, sight and touch. The observer in Locke’s example represents as
simultaneous two sounds (the ball hitting the entry and exit walls) and his
feeling of pain; if his eyes were open, what he saw would, presumably, also
be represented in the same single, complex, cross-modal idea or “snapshot”
of the event.
Let’s call the view that Locke is expounding here the “halting sensation
view”. Under it, the physical sense organs register information more quickly
than the information can be represented in idea. Hence, the ideas that are
formed as a result of impressions on the sense organs represent not what is
going on right now, but rather all that has been “stored up” in the sense
organs since the last idea was formed. On the halting sensation view, the
sense organs are like an information hopper: they hold information until
it can be transferred as a single batch into ideas. On the halting sensation
view, then, sensory ideas—the ideas you are having when you are awake and
your sense organs are being stimulated—are, in a possibly misleading sense,
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memories: they represent events that are an instant in the past. We do not
experience these ideas as memories; they are experienced as representations
of what is going on right now, but, in fact, they represent a world that has
just immediately passed.
The halting sensation view might be contrasted with a different position, a
position Locke is rejecting, that I’ll call the “smooth sensation view”. Under
the smooth sensation view, in sensory perception mental representations of
an object’s position align with changes in the object’s position. Or, in other
words, on the smooth sensation view, when an object changes position there is
an accompanying change in the mind’s representation of the object’s position.
The object is never represented as occupying more than one position at once.
We might think of the smooth sensation view as the halting view at the limit,
in which the intervals represented by ideas are infinitesimally small. On the
halting sensation view, there is, necessarily, a delay between the occurrence
of an event and the appearance in the mind of a representation of that event;
events can’t show up in the mind, as it were, until there is enough recorded
in the sensory organs to transfer into idea. If your finger is at point 0 at time
0, an idea cannot represent it as being there until, say, time 3 when the idea
representing all of the locations of the finger between times 0 and 3 pops
into the head. This is why sensory ideas, on the halting sensation view, are
necessarily something like memories. However, under the smooth sensation
view, there is no conceptual obstacle to imagining that ideas represent events
just as they happen. If your finger is at point 0 at time 0, there is no reason
why there couldn’t be an idea at time 0 that represents it as occupying the
very location that it occupies at that time. Nor, however, is there any obstacle
from the smooth sensation view, to imagining that sensory ideas are delayed.
Perhaps you don’t represent the finger’s position at time 0 until time 3, even
though you represent it’s position at time 0 + epsilon at time 3 + epsilon.
The differences between the smooth and halting views is perhaps better
illustrated in the following figure.
In explanation, imagine an object, a point, that sits at point 0 on a number
line. At time 0 the point begins to move to the right at exactly 1 unit per
second. And imagine that, under the halting sensation view, all that takes
place within a three second period is captured in a single “snapshot”. The
gray points indicate the locations that the object is represented as occupying
at each moment in time, under the halting sensation view. The black points
indicate the location that the object is represented as occupying at each mo-
ment in time, under the smooth sensation view. Under the smooth sensation
view, at any given moment the object is represented as occupying only one
location, and, we’ll assume, it is represented as occupying the location that
it occupied three seconds previously; at time 6, for instance, it is represented
as occupying point 3, which is exactly the point which it occupied at time
3. On the halting sensation view, the object is represented, for the first three
seconds, as sitting at point 0, since it sat at that point for the three seconds
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Figure 1. From time –3 to time 0, the represented object sits at point 0 before
starting to move at one unit per second from left to right on a number line. Grey
points indicate the locations the object is represented as occupying by the halting
idea, black by the smooth.
preceding time 0. At time 3, however, a new idea is produced that represents
the object as occupying, at once, all the places that it occupied from time 0
to time 3, namely, all the points between 0 and 3; at time 6, a new idea ap-
pears that represents the object as occupying all of the locations it occupied
between time 3 and 6, and so on.
Both the halting sensation view and the smooth sensation view are ac-
counts of the dynamics of sensory representation. They are accounts, that is,
of the mechanism of transfer of information from our sensory organs to our
ideas. On the version of the smooth sensation view represented in Figure 1,
there is a delay between the moment information hits the sensory organs and
the moment it is transferred to an idea—a delay of three seconds, as on the
halting view—but once information begins to flow from the sensory organs
to the idea, it does so smoothly, rather than in a batch, as on the halting
sensation view.
The halting sensation view implies that it is actually impossible to have the
idea of succession—to represent things as taking place one after another—
from a very short observation period that does not span multiple ideas;
the nature of the transition from sensory impression to idea excludes that
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possibility in just the way that a camera that opened the shutter for 1/24
of a second at a time could not represent events succeeding each other at a
shorter interval while the shutter was open as anything but simultaneous. If
a photograph of a ball streaking through the air represents the ball as being
in a succession of locations, it is because the person viewing the photograph
knows, already, that balls don’t jump through space and then back again, but,
instead, travel in continuous paths. It is not the photograph itself, then, that
represents the locations of the ball as successive; the photograph represents
them as occupied all at the same time by the ball; if the viewer of the
photograph sees a succession, it is because he supplies more than can be
found in the photograph itself. Similarly, if sensation is halting, then our
sensory ideas necessarily represent all that takes place within (what Locke
calls) an instant as non-successive.
So, Locke is not arguing for the negative claim by arguing, simple-
mindedly, that we don’t have a succession of distinct ideas when we don’t
sense motion, and do when we do. Rather, he is pointing out that the ideas
that we have immediately from sensation, whether or not we sense motion,
cannot, by the very nature of the mechanism through which they are formed,
represent events as successive. If the halting sensation view is right, and if
(although this is a big “if”) all and only the ideas that we have were those
that are formed immediately in response to impressions on our sense organs,
then we would have no ideas of succession. A mind so limited would be
limited indeed for it would, if Locke is right, represent all the events that it
encounters, in whatever order, as taking place in no order at all.
Of course, for Locke we have many ideas other than those that are formed
immediately in response to impressions on the sense organs. Putting aside,
for now, ideas of reflection, we also have all of the ideas that have their root
in sensory experience, but which are formed through the exercise of some
combination of the three important forms of mental operation: abstraction,
composition and comparing. (Abstraction is the means by which we create
general ideas from the ideas of particulars that experience affords. Compo-
sition is the means by which we combine ideas to create complexes that may
or may not be found in experience. And comparing is the means by which
we create ideas of relations from the ideas of relata.) Mightn’t the idea of du-
ration, the idea of continuous existence, be formed by taking ideas supplied
by sensation, under the halting sensation view, and manipulating them? If
those operations are capable of providing us with ideas of one quality formed
from ideas of entirely distinct qualities, then it might be possible to use them
to create an idea of succession from ideas that, necessarily, fail to represent
succession.
The prospects for creating the idea of duration from the available materials
using only abstraction and composition seem dim. To use an analogy, say
that I have two photographs each of which represents a distinct event. I can’t
create for myself a collage representing the one event as preceding the other
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just by taping those photos together, or by cutting parts out of them and then
taping the resulting pieces together. Since the photos don’t provide me with
any representation of succession, I’m at a loss to create such a representation
through the photographic analogues of composition and abstraction.
Comparing—the mental operator through which we form ideas of rela-
tions by setting side-by-side ideas of relata—seems more likely to provide
what is needed. If I can get the idea of the relation “to the left of” by com-
paring the idea of my right hand and the idea of my left, why couldn’t I get
the ideas of “before” and “after” by comparing my idea of the docked boat
with my idea of the boat at sea? Nothing that Locke says seems to rule out
this possibility entirely, although it is not the direction that he goes.6 Instead
of trying to exploit his notion of comparing to explain how we get the idea of
succession, Locke instead notices that when sensing something successive we
do indeed get succession, as it were, into our heads. It isn’t represented there:
the ideas immediately formed in response to sensory impressions do not rep-
resent it. But it is there in the ideas themselves, for they are in succession. All
by itself this does not make it true that we have the idea of succession—ideas
have many properties that a particular person might lack any idea of—but it
suggests a tool for explaining how we get the idea of succession. Perhaps we
get it not by looking out, but by looking in.
This brings us to the positive claim, the claim that we acquire the idea
of duration from reflection on the succession of our own ideas. Notice,
however, that there is a prima facie objection to the positive claim that is
encountered before we even see Locke’s reasons for it. If our sensory ideas
are not capable of representing succession, how could our ideas of reflection
make that possible? Say Locke is right that in sensation the mind is limited
in the way a camera is: all that takes place within certain short periods
of time is necessarily represented as non-successive. Why doesn’t it follow
that ideas of reflection, too, are so limited? You might think that whether
you look outward, as in sensation, or inward, as in reflection, the ideas
that are formed are like snapshots of that at which they are aimed, and
so cannot represent succession. Or, to put the point another way, if Locke
holds not just the halting sensation view, but what we might call “the halting
reflection view”, then he would be committed to the claim that reflection is
no more capable of providing the idea of succession than sensation is. The
way we think about an object’s movement as it takes place before our eyes
is by having ideas of it. Similarly, the way we think about our own mind’s
movement as it takes place before our inner eye is by having ideas of it. If
the inner eye supplies ideas of what’s going on in our minds in the same
halting manner as the eyes in our sockets supply ideas of what’s going on
outside, then there would be no more reason to think reflection capable of
providing the idea of succession than sensation is. If the halting reflection
view is true, then each idea of reflection would represent, say, three successive
sensory ideas as simultaneous, rather than in succession. It would be not just
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the sound of the cannonball hitting one wall, the pain, and the sound of it
hitting the other that would be represented as simultaneous; we would also
represent the ideas of those three events as simultaneous. What does this
objection show? It shows that since Locke thinks that reflection is capable of
providing the idea of succession, he is committed to thinking that reflection
is different from sensation in this respect. Reflection, unlike sensation, is not
merely halting. Perhaps reflection, by contrast, is smooth. Perhaps, that is,
reflection provides us with ideas of the states of our minds that represent
only one state at a time.
But how would smoothness help? If sensation were only smooth, and not
halting, would we be able to get the idea of succession from the perception
of motion? No. To have an idea of the successive locations occupied by
an ordinary physical object, you’d need to have, at once, an idea of each
of those locations. You can’t have an idea of succession unless you have
an idea that represents the various parts of the succession, the things that
are in order. It would not be enough to represent each of the locations the
object occupies; your idea, rather, has to embody a point of view from which
you can see, as it were, more than one location at once. Notice that under
the halting sensation view, sensory ideas do this much: the sensory idea
of the cannonball represents it as occupying both the location on one side
of the room and the location on the other. But representing a single thing
as occupying distinct locations is not enough to represent those locations
as in succession: the idea must also represent those locations as ordered, as
following one another in a sequence. Sensory ideas, on the halting sensation
view, fail to represent succession because they fail to have this feature. But
notice that if sensation were smooth our sensory ideas would fail to represent
succession for the opposite reason: they would fail to do so because they
would never represent an object as occupying distinct places; they would
never provide us with more than one part of the succession at a time, and
so would make it impossible to represent succession at all. Simplifying, we
might say that under the halting sensation view, each of our ideas presents
a segment of a time line; the trouble is that our ideas don’t tell us how the
points of the segment are ordered, or that they are ordered at all. On the
smooth sensation view, at any given instant a sensory idea presents only a
point on a time line; the trouble is that it never provides us with the multiple
points needed to make a succession.
What if sensation were both halting and smooth? What if, that is, impres-
sions on your sense organs gave you two ideas: one, the halting idea, that
represents all that happened in the last instant, although with no ordering
within that instant, and another, the smooth idea, that distinctly represents
the location of the object in the previous instant at each of the times during
that instant? If this were the case, it seems we could have the idea of suc-
cession from the perception of motion. Consider, again, Figure 1. From 3
to 6 seconds, you experience, in succession, the object to be occupying each
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of the locations from 0 to 3; this is your smoothly representing idea. In that
same time interval, from 3 to 6 seconds, you also have an idea of the “streak”
of the object: an idea that represents the object as occupying, at once, all of
the locations from 0 to 3. If you could put these two ideas together, you’d
have the idea of succession: the second idea tells you what the things are that
are to be in succession; it provides you with all of the locations of the object.
The first idea, the smooth idea, tells you how these things are to be ordered:
they are to be ordered as they are ordered in the smooth experience of them.
To use an analogy: imagine that you look at a photograph of the streak of
the cannonball, and while you are looking at it a cannonball-shaped spot-
light moves from left to right across the streak. The photograph (the halting
idea) shows you all the positions the cannonball occupied; the spotlight (the
smooth idea) shows you the order in which it occupied them. If reflection
is both halting and smooth, then consciousness gives you a dynamic picture
of the state of your mind during the previous instant, and, at once, a fixed
picture of the state it was in during that instant. By putting the two together
you are able to get the idea of the succession of your mind’s states. In your
halting idea, reflection represents the bundle of thoughts you had an instant
ago; in your smooth idea, reflection represents the order in which you had
each of the thoughts in the bundle. This is true, that is, if reflection is both
halting and smooth.
It’s clear that Locke takes sensation to be halting, and not smooth. After
all, he clearly thinks sensation is halting and also thinks that it fails to give us
the idea of succession. Since if it were also smooth it would give us that idea,
he must think it is not smooth. But what about reflection? We know that he
thinks that reflection is capable of giving us the idea of succession. So he must
think that either it is so capable in virtue of the fact that it is both halting
and smooth, or else for some other reason. At this point, it would be helpful
to have some textual evidence on the point. As far as I know, however, there
is none. What we have, instead, is only the following: Locke explicitly takes
sensation to be halting and explicitly takes the fact that sensation is halting
as part of the explanation for our failure to derive the idea of succession
from the sensory perception of motion. While this suggests that he would
solve the problem by appeal to a difference in this respect between reflection
and sensation—he would explain reflection’s ability to provide us with the
idea of succession through appeal to its being both halting and smooth—it
does not entail it. It remains possible, that is, that he takes reflection to
differ from sensation in some other way that allows it to provide us with the
idea of succession. But what way could that be? Notice that Locke cannot
simply point to the fact that the object of reflection—namely the succession
of our ideas—is successive to explain reflection’s ability to provide us with
the idea of succession. After all, motions, too, are successive, Locke thinks,
but sensation is not, on those grounds, able to provide us with the idea
of succession. It seems more likely that he identifies sensation as halting
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precisely because he takes himself to be thereby contrasting sensation with
reflection and thereby identifying the features of reflection in virtue of which
it provides us with the idea of succession. That is, given that (a) he makes the
distinction between halting and smooth awareness, and (b) that distinction
can help us to distinguish between awareness that can provide us with the
idea of succession and awareness that cannot—an awareness that is both
halting and smooth can give us the idea, but not awareness that is just one
or the other—and (c) he takes reflection to be capable, and sensation to be
incapable, of giving us the idea, it seems very likely that he takes reflection
to be both halting and smooth. There is powerful, albeit indirect evidence,
then, to suggest that Locke takes reflection to be both halting and smooth
and takes that fact about it to explain how we are able to acquire the idea of
succession from reflection.
Still, the position raises many questions. Not least among them is this:
where it seems that empirical evidence could be mustered to show that sen-
sation is halting—in fact, Locke’s cannonball example is a piece of empirical
evidence supportive of the claim—it is hard to see how comparable empiri-
cal evidence could be provided in support of the contention that reflection
is halting, especially if it is also smooth. One might wonder what grounds
there could be for such a claim, given that it is not a priori. Evidence could,
in theory, be provided by introspection. However, untrained introspection
does not seem to provide it, and training oneself to introspect on the repre-
sentational power of introspection itself is at least very difficult and perhaps
impossible. Further, the mere fact that reflection’s being both halting and
smooth would help to explain how it is that we have the idea of succession
does not provide support for the claim. After all, the idea of succession
might, instead, be innate. Relatedly, where we could measure the length of
time between events represented as simultaneous by sensation it is hard to
imagine how we could make comparable measurements of the “period” of
halting reflection. When an empiricist requires unsupported, and even pos-
sibly unsupportable, empirical claims in order to support his contention that
a particular idea has its source in experience, there seems to be a prob-
lem. Still, defensible or not, if Locke accepts that reflection is both halting
and smooth, that can tell us something important about his conception of
consciousness.
More, however, can be gleaned, still, from Locke’s discussion of duration.
Locke doesn’t think that it follows immediately, and without further explana-
tion, from the fact that reflection provides us with the idea of succession that
it furnishes us with the idea of duration, or continuous existence. We need
to explain how it is that once we have acquired the idea of the succession of
our ideas, we are able to acquire the idea of continuous existence from there.
This is the positive claim of the chapter on duration and we can learn more
about what Locke takes consciousness to be by considering what he says in
defense of it.
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Locke states the positive claim as follows:
‘Tis evident to any one who will but observe what Passes in his own Mind,
that there is a train of Ideas, which constantly succeed one another in his
Understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of
several Ideas one after another in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the
Idea of Succession: And the distance between any parts of that Succession, or
between the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we call Duration.
(II.xiv.3)
The claim is that by reflection on the succession of ideas, we come to have
an idea of something existing continuously over the course of the succession
of ideas. The statement of this view is immediately followed by a statement
of a reason favoring it:
For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several Ideas in
our Minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the Existence, or the
Continuation of the Existence of our selves, or any thing else, Commensurate
to the succession of any Ideas in our Minds, the Duration of our selves, or any
such other thing co-existing with our Thinking. (II.xiv.3)
Part of the point here seems to be deeply Cartesian: while you are thinking
you know that you exist. This point is supposed to help explain why a
succession of ideas gives rise to the idea of your own duration, the idea of
your own continuous existence. But how does the Cartesian point help? What
I suggest, and I’ll elaborate on the point, is that the Cartesian point helps
us to see encounters with ideas—which are “perpetually perishing”, they are
things the times of existence of which are essential to them—as encounters,
also, with things capable of existing at different times. Given that this is
part of what continuous existence is—it is the densely ordered successive
existence of things capable of existing at multiple times—the Cartesian point
is necessary for making the leap from the idea of succession to that of
duration.
To see what I mean, return to Figure 1 above and imagine that the ob-
ject that is “moving” is not a regular physical object, but your mind; and
imagine that the “locations” of the mind, its places, are its ideas. In short,
imagine that the y-axis represents distinct ideas, one for each point on the
y-axis, and the x-axis, still, represents time. If reflection is both halting and
smooth, at any given time, you have two ideas of reflection: one, the smooth
idea, that represents your mind as having the idea that it had exactly three
seconds ago, and, also, the halting idea, that represents your mind as having
had all of the various ideas that it had in the previous instant. But, given
the Cartesian point, both of these two ideas also represent you, a thing over
and above the ideas that they represent you as having. Interestingly, how-
ever, the smooth idea represents you at only one time, while the halting idea
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represents you at all of the times in the previous instant. At a typical time—
at, say, time 3 1/2—you have, then, a representation of yourself at time 1/2,
supplied by the smooth idea, and a representation of yourself at that time,
and at times both before and after that time, supplied by the halting idea.
But these ideas both represent you in a way which cannot but lead you to
identify the mind you are with the one you were and will be; each embodies
a cogito thought. It is as though you thought, at once, “I see, therefore I am”
and “I hear, therefore I am”; there’s no room to wonder if the one who sees
and the one who hears are distinct from one another; it’s simply impossible
not to identify them. Similarly, to have in your mind at once, in the instant
after the cannonball leaves the room, both an idea of the set of ideas that
you had during the previous instant and a continuously changing idea of
the ideas that went through your mind during that instant, is to have two
thoughts and two corresponding cogito thoughts; you think of all of what
you just thought and of just what you were thinking an instant ago and you
identify the two thinkers. But what this means, then, is that reflection has
given you the idea of yourself as continuously existing. Your smooth idea
is monitoring a mind; and your halting idea tells you it is the same mind
that it just perceived and is about to perceive, despite changes in its states.
If reflection is both smooth and halting then, given the Cartesian point, it
seems possible to acquire the idea of your own continuous existence, your
own duration, from reflection on the succession of your ideas. To put the
point another way: The halting idea supplies you with an idea of a densely
packed set of your mind’s places; your smooth idea supplies you with enough
to recognize those places as, in addition, densely ordered; the fact that each
is a cogito thought, and thus involves a thought not about an idea, but about
a mind, and only one mind at that, supplies you with enough to realize that
what you are encountering is not a succession of things that perish as soon as
they are born, but, instead, a succession of things, of minds, that are capable
of existence at more than one time. In short, the halting idea and the smooth
idea, given the Cartesian point, supply what is needed to have an idea of
your own continuous existence.
I started this paper by saying that I would draw from Locke’s discussion of
duration a difference between consciousness, on the one hand, and sensory
perception, on the other. What we’ve learned is that where Locke takes
sensation to be halting, he takes reflection to be both smooth and halting.
We acquire two ideas through reflection and they appear through different
routes: one through a halting mechanism and another through a smooth one.
What does this result tell us about Locke’s “same consciousness” theory of
personal identity?
To answer that question, start with an answer to a different question: Can
the explanation just given for how it is that, through reflection, we acquire
our idea of duration allow for the acquisition of the idea from a succession
of ideas in which there are temporal gaps between steps in the succession?
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Imagine someone, for instance, who has a horrible case of narcolepsy: he is
never awake for more than an instant, in Locke’s technical sense of the term
“instant”, and while he is asleep he does not dream at all. Such a person has
a single idea; then he has no ideas; then he awakes and has another single
idea before falling unconscious again; and so on. In between any two ideas
in succession there is a time when he is not conscious. Can such a person
acquire the idea of duration from reflection on the succession of his ideas?
Locke’s answer, I believe, is yes. The reason is that from the first personal
point of view, there is no gap in the succession. Locke makes this point in
the following remark:
When that succession of Ideas ceases, our perception of Duration ceases with it;
which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether
an hour, or a day; a month, or a year; of which Duration of things, whilst he
sleeps, or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and
the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think
again, seems to him to have no distance. . .But if sleep commonly unites the
distant parts of Duration, it is, because during that time we have no Succession
of Ideas in our Minds. For if a Man, during his Sleep, dreams, and variety
of Ideas make themselves perceptible in his Mind one after another, he hath
then, during such a dreaming, a Sense of Duration, and of the length of it. By
which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration, from their
Reflection on the train of the Ideas, they observe to succeed one another in their
own Understandings, without which Observation they can have no Notion of
Duration, whatever may happen in the World. (II.xiv.4)
Applying Locke’s point to our narcoleptic, and referring to the Figure 2, we
might describe the situation like this: Imagine that the narcoleptic awakes
for three second intervals and goes unconscious for one second intervals.
Imagine that over the course of the interval from time 0 to time 3, he passes
through all of the ideas, represented on the y-axis, from 0 to 3; at time 3 he
falls unconscious for one second. Now consider his situation when he awakes
at time 4. He has a halting idea of the ideas that he had over the course of
the interval from 0 to 3, and a smooth idea of the state of his mind at time
0. Thus, he is in precisely the same mental condition that he would have
been at time 3, had he not gone unconscious at all; he does not represent the
feature of his mind that distinguishes it from a normal person’s, namely that
he was unconscious from time 3 to time 4. If reflection on a succession of
ideas, because it is both smooth and halting, can give us the idea of duration,
it is because it creates the appearance of an encounter with a continuously
existing thing, oneself. So gaps such as those encountered by our narcoleptic
can confound the process of acquiring the idea of duration only if they have
an impact on the appearance. They don’t, claims Locke, and so they can’t.7
How does the narcoleptic in this example differ from the rest of us? It
seems that he differs only in the length of time he is awake and the length
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Figure 2. The represented mind has all of the ideas in the interval from 0 to 3 on
the y-axis in the interval from time −4 to time –1; it has the ideas from 3 to 6 in
the interval from time 0 to time 3. From times 3 to 4 and 7 to 8 it is completely
unconscious.
of time he is asleep. Locke is insistent that “Men think not always” (cf.
II.i.10) and uses the example of dreamless sleep to support the claim. If he
is to be taken at his word, then when waking from truly dreamless sleep you
should have no sense of time having passed from the moment you slipped
into unconsciousness until the moment you awoke. And similarly, you should
have the idea of yourself as having existed continuously from the moment of
sleep until the moment of waking (although you take that amount of time
to be very short). In short, nothing about the fact of dreamless sleep, which
Locke takes to be a part of all of our lives, bars the possibility of acquiring
the idea of one’s own duration, one’s continuous existence. Now it is, of
course, the fact of gaps in conscious experience that make the problem of
personal identity interesting: how could our conscious psychological states
constitute identity through time when there are times when they simply
aren’t present? But if those gaps pose no problem for acquiring the idea of
oneself as continuously, gaplessly, existing because they can be bridged by
consciousness, then perhaps consciousness can provide the same bridge in
constituting identity through time.
Now, at the outset, I noted two challenges for interpreting Locke’s “same
consciousness” theory of personal identity. The first problem is that it isn’t
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clear what consciousness is: which mental activities are acts of conscious-
ness? The second problem is that it isn’t clear what the identity conditions
are for acts of consciousness: what makes a later act the same as an earlier
in the sense relevant to personal identity? The differences between sensation
and consciousness that emerge from consideration of Locke’s account of the
acquisition of the idea of duration help us to meet both challenges. How
it does so with respect to the first is probably clear: Consciousness is both
a smooth and halting awareness of one’s mental states. This distinguishes
consciousness from other forms of awareness, and, in particular, from sensa-
tion. Further, since consciousness always involves two ideas, a halting idea of
the mental states of the previous instant, and a smooth idea of a particular
mental state enjoyed during that instant, it provides one with a conception
of oneself as continuously existing, as having duration. This is a distinctive
feature of consciousness, which distinguishes it from other mental activities.
To see how what has been said here helps to meet the second challenge,
the need to supply identity conditions for acts of consciousness, consider the
following famous passage:
[A]s far as. . .consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or
Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it
was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it,
that that Action was done. (II.xxvii.9)
The notion of consciousness “extending backwards” has been interpreted
as a reference to memory. But given what consciousness is, for Locke, it is
better to understand that notion like so: First, consider the basic case. What
does it mean for my consciousness to extend back to the actions I performed
seconds ago, assuming that I did not go unconscious in the interval? For
consciousness to extend back to that past action, there must be a succession
of ideas, beginning with ideas had at the time of that past action and ending
with my current ideas, from which the idea of duration, of my continuous
existence, can be derived. We’ve seen what’s required for that to be possible: I
must be able to reflect on the succession of ideas and have both a halting and
a smooth idea of them, each of which involves a cogito thought. When there
is a succession of ideas from the past person-stage to the present from which
the present can derive the idea of his continuous existence, there is identity.
As we’ve seen, this can be possible even across gaps in conscious experience,
as in dreamless sleep. We can also extend the basic case: perhaps person-
stages A and C can be thought of as stages of the same person if there’s
some other person-stage B such that the succession of ideas from A to B
allows B to derive the idea of continuous existence while the succession from
B to C allows C to do so. And, of course, we can imagine allowing identity
whenever such a sequence of person-stages can be constructed, even if such
a construction requires many more person-stages than three. Although this
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extension of the basic case will provide the tools with which to defend Locke
against putative counterexamples, such as that of Reid’s brave officer, it is
not an ad hoc addition to the theory designed merely for this purpose. On
the contrary: since at bottom the possibility of deriving the idea of duration
from a succession of ideas rests on the possibility of identifying the two
thinkers encountered in two cogito thoughts, one should expect inheritance
of these capacities: if A is in a position to identify himself in this special way
with B and B with C then A must be the same person as C, even if he cannot
identify himself with C in the same way. In any event, this, I suggest, is what
there is to Locke’s theory of personal identity.
Let me end with a point that deserves more elaboration than I will provide
here. Descartes thought that in the cogito, in thinking and thereby perceiving
oneself as something over and above one’s thoughts, we each found ourselves
perceiving a substance, a thing that depended for its existence on nothing
other than God. For Locke, however, what matters for identity is not that you
are a substantial thing that exists continuously through time, but, instead,
that you are in position to have the experience of yourself as such a thing. As
it turns out, the experience of one’s own substantiality can be present even
in changes of substance and so the self that exists continuously cannot be a
substance in the Cartesian sense. But, still, Locke’s theory of personal identity
owes a deep debt to Descartes, for Locke tries to exploit the psychological
features of cogito thoughts, features to which Descartes himself was very
sensitive, without insisting on the metaphysics that Descartes took those
psychological features to support. To be a single thing through time, for
both Descartes and Locke, is to be encountered in thought as continuously
existing; but for Locke and not for Descartes, the encounter is all there is to
the thing.8
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